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Abstract—In this work, we aim at building a bridge from poor behavioral data to an effective, quick-response, and robust behavior model
for online identity theft detection. We concentrate on this issue in online social networks (OSNs) where users usually have composite
behavioral records, consisting of multi-dimensional low-quality data, e.g., offline check-ins and online user generated content (UGC). As
an insightful result, we find that there is a complementary effect among different dimensions of records for modeling users’ behavioral
patterns. To deeply exploit such a complementary effect, we propose a joint model to capture both online and offline features of a
user’s composite behavior. We evaluate the proposed joint model by comparing with some typical models on two real-world datasets:
Foursquare and Yelp. In the widely-used setting of theft simulation (simulating thefts via behavioral replacement), the experimental
results show that our model outperforms the existing ones, with the AUC values 0.956 in Foursquare and 0.947 in Yelp, respectively.
Particularly, the recall (True Positive Rate) can reach up to 65.3% in Foursquare and 72.2% in Yelp with the corresponding disturbance
rate (False Positive Rate) below 1%. It is worth mentioning that these performances can be achieved by examining only one composite
behavior (visiting a place and posting a tip online simultaneously) per authentication, which guarantees the low response latency of our
method. This study would give the cybersecurity community new insights into whether and how a real-time online identity authentication
can be improved via modeling users’ composite behavioral patterns.
Index Terms—Online Social Networks, Identity Theft Detection, Composite Behavioral Modeling.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet, more and more
affairs, e.g., mailing [1], health caring [2], shopping [3],
booking hotels and purchasing tickets are handled online [4].
While, the Internet brings sundry potential risks of invasions
[5], such as losing financial information [6], identity theft
[7] and privacy leakage [3]. Online accounts serve as the
agents of users in the cyber world. Online identity theft is
a typical online crime which is the deliberate use of other
person’s account [8], usually as a method to gain a financial
advantage or obtain credit and other benefits in other person’s
name. In fact, compromised accounts are usually the portals
of most cybercrimes [1], [9], such as blackmail [6], fraud [10]
and spam [11]. Thus, identity theft detection is essential to
guarantee users’ security in the cyber world.
Traditional identity authentication methods [12], [13] are
mostly based on access control schemes, e.g., passwords and
tokens [14]. But users have to spend overheads in managing
dedicated passwords or tokens. Accordingly, the biometric
identification [15]–[18] is delicately introduced to start the era
of password free. However, some disadvantages make these
access control schemes still incapable of being effective in
real-time online services [19]: (1) They are not non-intrusive.
Users have to spend extra time in authentication. (2) They are
not continuous. The defending system will fail to take further
protection once the access control is broken.
Behavior-based suspicious account detection [19] is a
highly-anticipated solution to pursue a non-intrusive and con-
tinuous identity authentication for online services. It depends
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on capturing users’ suspicious behavior patterns to discrimi-
nate the suspicious accounts. The problem can be divided into
two categories: fake/sybil account detection and compromised
account detection [20]. The fake/sybil account’s behavior
usually does not conform to the behavioral pattern of the
majority. While, the compromised account usually behaves in
a pattern that does not conform to his/her previous one, even
behaves like fake/sybil accounts. It can be solved by capturing
mutations of users’ behavioral patterns.
Comparing with detecting compromised accounts, detect-
ing fake/sybil accounts is relatively easy, since the latter’s
behaviors are generally more detectable than the former’s.
It has been extensively studied, and can be realized by var-
ious population-level approaches, e.g., clustering [21], [22],
classification [6], [23] and statistical or empirical rules [10],
[24]–[26]. Thus, we only focus on the compromised account
detection, commonly-called identity theft detection, based on
individual-level behavior models.
Recently, researchers have proposed different individual-
level identity theft detection methods based on suspicious
behavior detection [11], [27]–[33]. However, the efficacy of
these methods significantly depends on the sufficiency of
behavior records, suffering from the low-quality of behavior
records due to data collecting limitations or some privacy
issues [3]. Especially, when a method only utilizes a specific
dimension of behavioral data, the efficacy damaged by poor
data is possibly enlarged. Unfortunately, most existing works
just concentrate on a specific dimension of users’ behavior,
such as keystroke [27], clickstream [30], and user generated
content (UGC) [11], [31], [32].
In this paper, we propose an approach to detect identity theft
by jointly using multi-dimensional behavior records which
are possibly insufficient in each dimension. According to
such characteristics, we choose the online social network
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2Fig. 1: An illustration of composite behavior space.
(OSN) as a typical scenario where most users’ behaviors are
coarsely recorded [34]. In the Internet era, users’ behaviors
are composited by offline behaviors, online behaviors, social
behaviors, and perceptual/cognitive behaviors, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. For OSN users, the behaviorial data are collectable
in many daily life applications, such as offline check-ins
in location-based services, online tips-posting in UGC sites,
and social relationship-making in OSN sites [33], [35], [36].
Accordingly, we design our method based on users’ composite
behaviors by these categories shown in Fig. 1.
We devote to proving that a high-quality (effective, quick-
response, and robust) behavior model can be obtained by inte-
grally using multi-dimensional behaviorial data, even though
the quality of data is extremely insufficient in each dimension.
For this challenging objective, a precondition is to solve users’
data insufficiency problem. The majority of users commonly
have only several behavioral records that are too insufficient
to build qualified behavior models. For this issue, we adopt
a tensor decomposition-based method [37] by combining the
similarity among users (in terms of interests to both tips
and places) with social ties among them. Then, to fully
utilize potential information in composite behaviors for user
profiling, we propose a joint probabilistic generative model
based on Bayesian networks, called Composite Behavioral
Model (CBM). It offers a composition of the typical features
in two different behavior spaces: check-in location in offline
behavior space and UGC in online behavior space. Consider
a composite behavior of a user, we assume that its generative
mechanism is as follows: When a user plans to visit a venue
and simultaneously post tips online, he/she subconsciously
select a specific behavioral pattern according to his/her be-
havior distribution. Then, he/she comes up with a topic and a
targeted venue based on the present pattern’s topic and venue
distributions, respectively. Finally, his/her comment words are
generated following the corresponding topic-word distribution.
To estimate the parameters of the mentioned distributions, we
adopt the collapsed Gibbs sampling [36].
Based on the joint model CBM, for each composite behav-
ior, denoted by a triple-tuple (u, v,D), we can calculate the
chance of user u visiting venue v and posting a tip online
with a set of words D. Taking into account different levels
of activity of different users, we devise a relative anomalous
score Sr to measure the occurrence rate of each composite
behavior (u, v,D). By these approaches, we finally realize
a real-time (i.e., judging by only one composite behavior)
detection for identity theft suspects.
We evaluate the proposed joint model by comparing with the
typical models on two real-world OSN datasets: Foursquare
[35] and Yelp [38]. We adopt the area under the receiver
operating characteristic curve (AUC) as the detection efficacy.
In the widely-used setting of theft simulation (simulating thefts
via behavioral replacement) [39], the AUC value reaches 0.956
in Foursquare and 0.947 in Yelp, respectively. Particularly, the
recall (True Positive Rate) reaches up to 65.3% in Foursquare
and 72.2% in Yelp with the corresponding disturbance rate
(False Positive Rate) below 1%. Note that these performances
can be achieved by examining only one composite behavior
per authentication, which guarantees the low response latency
of our detection method. As an insightful result, we learn that
the complementary effect does exist among different dimen-
sions of low-quality records for modeling users’ behaviors.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work jointly
leveraging online and offline behaviors to detect identity theft
in OSNs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give an
overview of our solution in Section 2. Then, we present our
method in Section 3, and make the validation in Section 4.
We provide a literature review in Section 5. Finally, we draw
conclusions in Section 6.
2 OVERVIEW OF OUR SOLUTION
Online identity theft occurs when a thief steals a user’s
personal data and impersonates the user’s account. Generally,
a thief usually first gathers information about a targeted user
to steal his/her identity and then use the stolen identity to
interact with other people to get further benefits [9]. Criminals
in different online services usually have different motivations.
In this work, we focus on online social networks (OSNs).
In some OSNs, one may know their online friends’ real-
life identities. Thieves usually utilize the strong trust between
friends to obtain benefit [40]. Their behavioral records usually
contain specific sensitive terms. In other scenarios, friends may
not be familiar with each other and lack direct interactions
in the real world, which makes thieves can not obtain direct
benefit from cheating users’ friends. So they turn to spread
malicious messages in these OSNs. Among these malicious
messages, some have explicit features such as URLs and
contact numbers, others only contain deceptive comments on a
place, a star or an event. The latter messages look like normal
ones, which makes them harder to detect. Thus, we apply a
widely-used setting of theft simulation, i.e., simulating thefts
via behavioral replacement, to represent this kind of thieves.
An OSN user’s behavior is usually composite of online and
offline behaviors occurring in different behavioral spaces, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. Based on this fact, we aim to propose a
joint model to embrace them into a unified model to deeply
extract information.
Before introducing our joint model, named Composite Be-
havioral Model (CBM), we provide some conceptions as
preparations. The relevant notations are listed in Table 1.
3TABLE 1: Notations of Parameters
Variable Description
w the word in UGC
v the venue or place
piu the community memberships of user u, expressed by a
multinomial distribution over communities
θc the interests of community c, expressed by a multinomial
distribution over topics
ϑc a multinomial distribution over spatial items specific to
community c
φz a multinomial distribution over words specific to topic z
α, β, γ, η Dirichlet priors to multinomial distributions θc, φz , piu and
ϑc, respectively
Definition 1 (Composite Behavior). A composite behavior,
denoted by a four-tuple (u, v,D, t), indicates that at time t,
user u visits venue v and simultaneously posts online a tip
consisting of a set of words D.
We remark that for a composite behavior, the occurring
time t is a significant factor. Two types of time attributes play
important roles in digging potential information for improving
the identification. The first is the sequential correlation of
behaviors. However, in real-life OSNs, the time intervals
between adjacent recorded behaviors are mostly unknown or
overlong, which leads that the temporal correlations cannot
be captured effectively. The second is the temporal property
of behaviors, e.g., periodicity and preference variance over
time. However, in some real-life OSN datasets, the occurring
time is recorded with a low resolution, e.g., by day, which
shields the possible dependency of a user’s behavior on the
occurring time. Thus, it is difficult to obtain reliable time-
related features of users’ behaviors. Since we aim to propose
a practical method based on uncustomized datasets of user
behaviors, we only concentrate on the dependency between
a user’s check-in location and tip-posting content of each
behavior, taking no account of the impact of specific occurring
time in this work. Thus, the representation of a composite
behavior can be simplified into a triple-tuple (u, v,D) without
confusion in this paper.
Our model depends on the following assumptions: (1) Each
user behaves in multiple patterns with different possibilities;
(2) Some users have similar behavioral patterns, e.g., similar
interests in topics and places.
To describe the features of users’ behaviors, we first intro-
duce the topic of tips.
Definition 2 (Topic, [41]). Given a set of words W , a topic
z is represented by a multinomial distribution over words,
denoted by φz , whose every component φz,w denotes the
possibility of word w occurring in topic z.
Next, we formulate a specific behavioral pattern of users
by a conception called community.
Definition 3 (Community). A community is a set of users
with a similar behavioral pattern. Let C denote the set of all
communities. A community c ∈ C has two critical parameters:
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Fig. 1. Optimal delay for the optimal capacity (of order Θ(1)) and the corresponding critical parameter lS under the
protocol model (ProM)/physical model (PhyM) and generalized physical model (GphyM).
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Fig. 4. Optimal delay depending on the freedom degree γ. The solid curve (including the “singletons”, i.e., isolated
nodes) denotes the function of optimal delay in terms of γ; the dashed curves denote the upper and lower bounds of
this function.
can explain why improvements on capacity-delay tradeoffs for
some mobility models can be achieved by the rate adaptation.
2 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we initiated an investigation of the impact of
adaptive-rate communication model on capacity-delay trade-
offs in MANETs under some classical mobility models. We
derived the optimal delay for the optimal unicast capacity
by using the well-known two-hop relay policy, and made it
clear how the capacity-delay tradeoffs in MANETs change
under different mobility models when the rate adaptation is
introduced.
There are some limitations of our work that can be left
for the future research: (1) There remain gaps between the
lower and upper bounds on capacity and delay for some
regimes. It is necessary to derive tight bounds in the whole
regime and provide more complete and conclusive results.
(2) In order to concentrate on stressing new insights of the
impact of rate adaptation, we constrained the strategies to the
type of simple threshold-based two-hop relaying schemes in
this work. An important work is to extend our results by
taking into account some advanced relay techniques, such
as replication and network-layer cooperation policies. (3) We
only considered unicast sessions in this work. It should be
interesting to extend our results to other traffic sessions, e.g.,
multicast, broadcast, convergecast, anycast and manycast.
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Fig. 2: Graphical representation of joint model. The parameters
are explained in Table 1.
(1) A topic distribution θc whose component, say θc,z , indi-
cates the probability that users in community c send a m ssage
with topic z. (2) A spati l distribution ϑc whose mp nent,
say ϑc,v , represents the ch nce that users in community c visit
venue v.
More specifically, we assume that a community s formed
by the following proc dure: Each user u is included in
communi ies according to a multinomial distribution, denoted
by piu. That is, each component of piu, say piu,c, denotes u’s
affiliation degree to community c. Similarly, we allocate each
community c with a topic distribution θc to represent its online
topic preference and a spatial distribution ϑc to represent its
offline mobility pattern.
The graphical representation of our joint model CBM is
demonstrated in Fig. 2.
3 METHOD
3.1 Composite Behavioral Model
Generally, users take actions according to their regular be-
havioral patterns which are represented by the corresponding
communities (Definition 3). We present the behavioral gener-
ative process in Algorithm 1: When a user u is going to visit a
venue and post online tips there, he/she subconsciously select
a specific behavioral pattern, denoted by community c, ac-
cording to his/her community distribution piu (Line 11). Then,
he/she comes up with a topic z and a targeted venue v based on
the present community’s topic and venue distributions (θc and
ϑc, respectively) (Line 12− 13). Finally, the words of his/her
tips in D are generated following the topic-word distribution
φz (Line 15).
Exact inference of our joint model CBM is difficult due to
the intractable normalizing constant of the posterior distribu-
tion, [36]. We adopt collapsed Gibbs sampling for approxi-
mately estimating distributions (i.e., θ, ϑ, φ and pi). As for
the hyperparameters, we take a fixed value, i.e., α = 50/Z,
γ = 50/C and β = η = 0.01, following the study in [42],
where Z and C are the numbers of topics and communities,
respectively.
In each iteration, for each composite behavior (u, v,D), we
first sample community c according to Eq. (1):
P (c|c¬, z,v, u) ∝ (n¬u,c+γ)
n¬c,z + α∑
z′(n
¬
c,z′ + α)
n¬c,v + η∑
v′(n
¬
c,v′ + η)
,
(1)
where c¬ denotes the community allocation for all composite
behaviors except the current one; z denotes the topic allocation
4Algorithm 1 Joint Probabilistic Generative Process
1: for each community c ∈ C do
2: Sample the distribution over topics θc ∼ Dirichlet(·|α)
3: Sample the distribution over venues
ϑc ∼ Dirichlet(·|η)
4: end for
5: for each topic z ∈ Z do
6: Sample the distribution over words
φz ∼ Dirichlet(·|β)
7: end for
8: for each user u ∈ U do
9: Sample the distribution over communities
piu ∼ Dirichlet(·|γ)
10: for each composite behavior (u, v,D) ∈ Bu do
11: Sample a community indicator c ∼Multi(piu)
12: Sample a topic indicator z ∼Multi(θc)
13: Sample a venue v ∼Multi(ϑc)
14: for each word w ∈ D do
15: Sample a word w ∼Multi(φz)
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
for all composite behaviors; nu,c denotes the number of times
that community c is generated by user u; nc,z denotes the
number of times that topic z is generated by community c; nc,v
denotes the number of times that venue v is visited by users
in community c; a superscript ¬ denotes something except the
current one.
Then, given a community c, we sample topic z according
to the following Eq. (2):
P (z|z¬, c,D) ∝ (n¬c,z + α)
∏
w∈D
n¬z,w + β∑
w′(n
¬
z,w′ + β)
, (2)
where nz,w denotes the number of times that word w is
generated by topic z.
The inference algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. We
first randomly initialize the topic and community assignments
for each composite behavior (Line 2−4). Then, we update the
community and topic assignments for each composite behavior
based on Eqs. (1) and (2) in each iteration (Line 6−9). Finally,
we estimate the parameters, test the coming cases and update
the training set every Is iterations since Ibth iteration (Line
10− 13) to address concept drift.
To overcome the problem of data insufficiency, we adopt the
tensor decomposition [37] to discover their potential behaviors.
In our experiment, we use the Twitter-LDA [43] to obtain
each UGC’s topic and construct a tensor A ∈ RN×M×L,
with three dimensions standing for users, venues and topics.
Then, A(u, v, z) denotes the frequency that user u posting a
message on topic z in venue v. We can decompose A into
the multiplication of a core tensor S ∈ RdU×dV ×dZ and three
matrices, U ∈ RN×dU , V ∈ RM×dV , and Z ∈ RL×dZ , if
using a tucker decomposition model, where dU , dV and dZ
denote the number of latent factors; N , M and L denote the
number of users, venues and topics. An objective function to
Algorithm 2 Inference Algorithm of the Joint Model CBM
Require: user composite behavior collection B, number of
iteration I , start saving step Ib, saving lag Is, start training
sequence number Nb, end training sequence number Ne,
hyperparameters α, β, γ and η
Ensure: estimated parameters θˆ, ϑˆ, φˆ, pˆi
1: Create temporary variables θsum, ϑsum, φsum and pisum,
initialize them with zero, set testing sequence number
Nt = 0 and let B(Nt) denotes the corresponding training
collection for testing behaviors which sequence number
values Nt
2: for each composite behavior (u, v,D) ∈ B(Nt) do
3: Sample community and topic randomly
4: end for
5: for iteration = 1 to I do
6: for each behavior (u, v,D) ∈ B(Nt) do
7: Sample community c according to Eq. (1)
8: Sample topic z according to Eq. (2)
9: end for
10: if (iteration > Ib) and (iteration mod Is == 0)
then
11: return model parameters as follows:
θc,z =
nc,z+α∑
z′ (nc,z′+α)
; ϑc,v =
nc,v+η∑
v′ (nc,v′+η)
piu,c =
nu,c+γ∑
c′ (nu,c′+γ)
; φz,w =
nz,w+β∑
w′ (nz,w′+β)
12: Evaluate corresponding test cases and update Nt++;
Nb ++; Ne ++
13: end if
14: end for
control the errors is defined as:
L(S,U,V,Z) = 1
2
‖A− S×U U×V V ×Z Z‖2
+
λ
2
(
‖S‖2 + ‖U‖2 + ‖V‖2 + ‖Z‖2 +
∑
(i,j)∈F u
T
i uj
)
,
where F is a set of friend pairs (i, j). A∗ = S×UU×V V×ZZ
is the potential frequency tensor, and A∗(u, v, z) denotes the
frequency that user u may post a message on topic z in venue
v. A higher A∗(u, v, z) indicates that user u has a higher
chance to do this kind of behavior in the future. We limit the
competition space to the behavior space of u’s friends, i.e.,{
(u, v, z)|A(u′ , v, z) > 0, (u, u′) ∈ F
}
,
and select the top 20 behaviors as his/her latent behavior to
improve data quality.
3.2 Identity Theft Detection Scheme
By the parameters Ψˆ = {θˆ, ϑˆ, φˆ, pˆi} learnt from the inference
algorithm (Algorithm 2), we can estimate the logarithmic
anomalous score (Sl) of a composite behavior (u, v,D) by
Eq. (3):
Sl(u, v,D) = − lgP (v,D|u)
= − lg
(∑
c
pˆiu,cϑˆc,v
∑
z
θˆc,z(
∏
w∈D
φˆz,w)
1
|D|
)
.
(3)
5TABLE 2: Statistics of Foursquare and Yelp Datasets
Foursquare Yelp
# of users 31,493 80,592
# of venue 143,923 42,051
# of check-ins 267,319 491,393
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Fig. 3: The distribution of user record counts.
However, we may mistake some normal behaviors occurring
with low probability, e.g., the normal behaviors of users whose
behavioral diversity and entropy are both high, for suspicious
behaviors. Thus, we propose a relative anomalous score (Sr)
to indicate the trust level of each behavior by Eq. (4):
Sr(u, v,D) = 1− P (u|v,D) = 1− P (v,D|u)P (u)∑
u′ P (v,D|u′)P (u′)
.
(4)
We randomly select 40 users to estimate the relative anomalous
score for each composite behavior. Our experimental results
in Section 4 show that the approach based on Sr outperforms
the approach based on Sl.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we present the experimental results to evaluate
the proposed joint model CBM, and validate the efficacy of
the joint model for identity theft detection on real-world OSN
datasets.
4.1 Datasets
Our experiments are conducted on two real-life large OSN
datasets: Foursquare [35] and Yelp [38]. They are two well-
known online social networking service providers. In both
datasets, there is no URLs or other sensitive terms. Both
datasets contain users’ social ties and behavioral records. Each
social tie contains user-ID and friend-ID. Each behavior record
contains user-ID, venue-ID, timestamp and UGC. Their basic
statistics are shown in Table 2.
We count each user’s records, and present the results in Fig.
3. It shows that most users have less than 5 records in both
datasets. The quality of these dataset is too poor to model
individual-level behavioral patterns for the majority of users,
which confronts our method with a big challenge.
4.2 Experiment Settings
4.2.1 Suspicious Behavior Simulation
Many works [8], [29], [44] aimed at discovery theft’s behav-
ioral pattern. Bursztein et al. [40] pointed out that identity
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Fig. 4: The histogram of logarithmic anomalous score Sl
(defined in Eq. (3)) for each behavior.
thieves usually behave in two possible suspicious patterns, i.e.,
(1) behaving unlike the majority of users; (2) behaving only
unlike the victim. Many existing outlier detecting techniques,
e.g., i-Forest [45], LOF [46] and GSDPMM [47] can deal with
the former cases. Besides, we notice that the former can be
regarded as a special case of the latter. It is straightforward
that an effective detection method for the latter can apply
effectively to the former cases. If the experiments validate that
our model performs well even for detecting such crafty thieves,
a strong argument can be obtained to prove the capability of
our model. This is the reason why we focus on the latter cases
where thieves tend to hind them among the people.
In the experiments, we use two real-life datasets, and
assume that all records are normal behaviors. We simulate
suspicious behaviors by exchanging some users’ behavioral
records and setting them as positive instances [40]. This
theft simulation process imitates one kind of the most crafty
thieves who behave just like normal users. More specifically,
we first rank behavior records according to their timestamps.
Then, we select the top 80% behavior records for training
and the rest for testing. To simulate suspicious behaviors, we
randomly exchange 5% of all behavior records in the test
set as anomalous behaviors. Totally, we have 56, 236 test
behaviors in Foursquare and 71, 667 in Yelp, and make up
2, 884 anomalous behaviors in Foursquare and 3, 583 in Yelp,
respectively.
4.2.2 Metrics
For the convenience of description, we first give a confusion
matrix in Table 3.
TABLE 3: Confusion Matrix for Binary Classification.
Predicted Condition
True Condition
Positive Negative
Positive True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Negative False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
In the experiments, we set anomalous behaviors as positive
instances, and focus on the following four metrics, since the
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Fig. 5: The histogram of relative anomalous score Sr (defined
in Eq. (4)) for each behavior.
identity theft detection is essentially an imbalanced binary
classification problem [48].
True Positive Rate (TPR): TPR is computed by TPTP+FN ,
and indicates the proportion of true positive instances in all
positive instances (i.e., the proportion of anomalous behaviors
that are detected in all anomalous behaviors). It is also known
as recall. Specifically, we named it detection rate.
False Positive Rate (FPR): FPR is computed by FPFP+TN ,
and indicates the proportion of false positive instances in all
negative instances (i.e., the proportion of normal behaviors that
are mistaken for anomalous behaviors in all normal behaviors).
Specifically, we named it disturbance rate.
Precision: The precision is computed by TPTP+FP , and in-
dicates the proportion of true positive instance in all predicted
positive instance (i.e., the proportion of anomalous behaviors
that are detected in all suspected cases).
AUC: Given a rank of all test behaviors, the AUC value
can be interpreted as the probability that a classifier/predictor
will rank a randomly chosen positive instance higher than a
randomly chosen negative one.
4.2.3 Threshold Selection
It is an important issue in classification tasks. Recall that for
the hyper-parameters α, β, γ and η, we adopt a fixed value,
i.e., α = 50/Z, γ = 50/C and β = η = 0.01, following
the study [36]. Specifically, we take the case that C = 30
and Z = 20 as an example to present the threshold selection
strategy. The parameter sensitivity analysis will be conducted
in the following Section 4.2.4. We compare the distribution of
logarithmic anomalous score Sl (or relative anomalous score
Sr) for normal behaviors with that for anomalous behaviors.
Figs. 4 and 5 present the differences between normal and
anomalous behaviors in terms of the distributions of Sl and
Sr, respectively. They show that the differences are both
significant, and the difference in terms of Sr is much more
obvious.
To obtain a reasonable threshold, we focus on the perfor-
mance where the threshold changes from 0.975 to 1, since this
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Fig. 6: A partial of the distribution of relative anomalous score
Sr (defined in Eq. (4)) for each behavior.
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Fig. 7: A partial of ROC (receiver operating characteristic)
curve of identity theft detection.
range contains 81.5% (81.4%) of all anomalous behaviors and
3.9% (4.8%) of all normal behaviors in Foursquare (Yelp).
The detailed trade-offs are demonstrated in Figs. 6 and 7
from different aspects. To optimize the trade-offs of detection
performance, we define the detection Cost in Eq. (5):
Cost =
# of newly mistaken normal behaviors
# of newly identified anomalous behaviors
. (5)
We present the threshold-cost curve in Fig. 8. It shows that a
smaller threshold usually corresponds to a larger cost.
We select the minimum threshold satisfying that the corre-
sponding cost is less than 1. Thus, we choose 0.989 and 0.992
as the thresholds for Foursquare and Yelp, respectively. Under
them, our joint model CBM reaches 62.32% (68.75%) in TPR
and 0.85% (0.71%) in FPR on Foursquare (Yelp). Please refer
to Table 4 for details.
4.2.4 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
Parameter tuning is another important part of our work. The
performance of our model is indeed sensitive to the number
of communities (C) and topics (Z). Therefore, we study the
impact of varying parameters in our model. We select the
relative anomalous score Sr as the test variable, and evaluate
the performance of our model by changing the values of C
and Z. The experimental results are summarized in Tables 5.
From the results on both datasets, the detection efficacy goes
stable when the number of topics reaches 20 and the number
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Fig. 8: Detection costs with different thresholds.
TABLE 4: A Summary of Different Metrics [49] with the
Threshold 0.989 for Foursquare and 0.992 for Yelp.
Foursquare Yelp
AUC 0.956 0.947
Precision 79.91% 83.55%
Recall (TPR) 62.32% 68.75%
FPR 0.85% 0.71%
TNR 99.15% 99.29%
FNR 37.68% 31.25%
Accuracy 97.26% 97.76%
F1 0.700 0.754
of communities has a larger impact on the efficacy. Thus, we
set C = 30 and Z = 20 in our joint model, and present the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and Precision-Recall
curves in Figs. 9 and 10, respectively. Specifically, we present
detection rate (TPR) in Table 6, where disturbance rate (FPR)
reaches 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
4.3 Performance Comparison
4.3.1 Representative Models
We compare our joint model CBM to some representative
models in OSNs. In Table 7, we list the features of these
models.
CF-KDE. Before presenting the CF-KDE model, we in-
troduce the Mixture Kernel Density Estimate (MKDE) [39]
to give a brief prior knowledge on Kernel Density Estimate
(KDE). MKDE is an individual-level spatial distribution model
based on KDE. It is a typical spatial model describing user’s
offline behavioral pattern. In this model, it mainly utilizes a
bivariate density function in the following equations to capture
the spatial distribution for each user:
fKDE (e|E, h) = 1
n
∑n
j=1
Kh
(
e− ej) , (6)
Kh (x) =
1
2pih
exp
(
−1
2
xTH−1x
)
,H =
(
h 0
0 h
)
, (7)
fMKDE (e|E, h) = αfKD (e|E1) + (1− α) fKD (e|E2) .
(8)
In Eq. (6), E = {e1, ..., en} is a set of historical behavioral
records for a user and ej =< x, y > is a two-dimensional
spatial location (i.e., offline behavior). Eq. (7) is a kernel
function and H is the bandwidth matrix. MKDE adopts Eq.
(8), where E1 is a set of an individual’s historical behavioral
records (individual component), E2 is a set of his/her friends’
historical behavioral records (social component), and α is the
TABLE 5: AUC on Foursquare (Yelp) Dataset
C=10 C=20 C=30
Z=10 0.876 (0.910) 0.945 (0.936) 0.953 (0.945)
Z=20 0.917 (0.915) 0.946 (0.938) 0.956 (0.947)
Z=30 0.922 (0.917) 0.947 (0.938) 0.957 (0.947)
TABLE 6: Detection Rates with Different Disturbance Rates.
Foursquare Yelp
Disturbance Rate=0.1% 30.8% 31.7%
Disturbance Rate=1.0% 65.3% 72.2%
weight variable for individual component. To detect identity
thieves, we compute a surprise index Se in Eq. (9) for
each behavior e, defined as the negative log-probability of
individual u’s conducting behavior e:
Se = − log fMKDE (e|Eu, hu) . (9)
Furthermore, we can select the top-N behaviors with the
highest Se as suspicious behaviors.
In MKDE model, it assumes that users tend to do like
their friends in the same chance. It has not quantified the
potential influence of different friends. Thus, we introduce
a collaborative filtering method to improve the performance.
Based on the historical behavioral records, it establishes a user-
venue matrix R|U|×|V|, where U and V are the number of
users and venues, respectively; Rij = 1 if user i has visited
venue j in the training set, otherwise Rij = 0. We adopt a
matrix factorization method with an objective function in Eq.
(10) to obtain feature vectors for each user and venue:
L = min
U,V
1
2
U∑
i=1
V∑
j=1
(Rij−uTi vj)2+
λ1
2
U∑
i=1
uTi ui+
λ2
2
V∑
j=1
vTj vj .
(10)
Specifically, we let
ui = (u
(1)
i , u
(2)
i , ..., u
(k)
i )
T and vj = (v
(1)
j , v
(2)
j , ..., v
(k)
j )
T .
We adopt a stochastic gradient descent algorithm in Eqs. (11)
and (12) in the optimization process:
u
(k)
i ← u(k)i − α(
∑V
j=1
(Rij − uTi vj)v(k)j + λ1u(k)i ), (11)
v
(k)
j ← v(k)j − α(
∑U
i=1
(Rij − uTi vj)u(k)i + λ2v(k)j ). (12)
Consequently, we can figure out Rˆ = UTV, and use
rˆij = u
T
i vj as the weight variable for the KDE model. To
detect anomalous behaviors, we use Eq. (13) to measure the
surprising index for each behavior e:
Se = − log
∑n
j=1 rˆujKh
(
e− ej)∑n
j=1 rˆuj
. (13)
Furthermore, we can select the top-N behaviors with the
highest Se as suspicious behaviors.
LDA. Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [41] is a classic
topic model. User’s online behavior pattern can be denoted as
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Fig. 9: The ROC curves of identity theft detection via the joint
model CBM.
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Fig. 10: The Precision-Recall curves of identity theft detection
via the joint model CBM.
the mixing proportions for topics. We aggregate the UGC of
each user and his/her friends in the training set as a document,
then use LDA to obtain each user’s historical topic distribution
θhis. To get their present behavioral topic distribution θnew in
the test set. For each behavior, we count the number of words
assigned to the kth topic, and denoted it as n(k). The kth
component of the topic proportion vector can be computed in
Eq. (14):
θ(k)new =
n (k) + α∑K
i=1(n (i) + α)
, (14)
where K is the number of topics, and α is a hyperparameter.
Specifically, we set α = 50/K.
To detect anomalous behaviors, we measure the distance
between a user’s historical and present topic distribution by
using the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence in Eqs. (15) and
(16):
DKL (θhis, θnew) =
∑K
i=1
θ
(i)
his · ln
(
θ
(i)
his/θ
(i)
new
)
, (15)
DJS (θhis, θnew) =
1
2
[DKL (θhis,M) +DKL (θnew,M)] .
(16)
where M = θhis+θnew2 . We can select the top-N behaviors
with the highest DJS(θhis, θnew) as suspicious behaviors.
Fused Model. Egele et al. [8] propose COMPA which
directly combining use users’ explicit behavior features, e.g.,
language, links, message source, et al. In our case, we setup
a fused model, which deep combine users’ implicit behavior
features discovered by CF-KDE and LDA to detect identity
theft. We try different thresholds for the CF-KDE model and
LDA model (i.e., different classifiers). For each pair (i.e., a CF-
KDE model and an LDA model), we treat any behavior that
fails to pass either identification model as suspicious behavior,
TABLE 7: Behaviors Adopted in Different Models
Online Behavior (UGC) Offline Behavior (Check-in)
CF-KDE NO YES
LDA YES NO
FUSED YES YES
JOINT YES YES
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Fig. 11: Identity theft detection efficacy.
and compute true positive rate and false positive rate to draw
the ROC curve and estimate the AUC value.
4.3.2 Performance Comparison
We compare the performance of our method with the typical
ones in terms of detection efficacy (AUC) and response la-
tency. The latter denotes the number of behaviors in the test
set needed to cumulate for detecting a specific identity theft
case.
Detection Efficacy Analysis. In Fig. 11, we present the re-
sults of all comparison methods. Our joint model outperforms
all other methods on the two datasets. The AUC value reaches
0.956 and 0.947 in Foursquare and Yelp datasets, respectively.
There are three reasons for its outstanding performance.
Firstly, it embraces different types of behaviors and exploits
them in a unified model. Secondly, it takes advantage of
the community members’ and friends’ group-level behavior
patterns to overcome the data insufficiency and concept drift
[40] in individual-level behavioral patterns. Finally, it utilizes
correlations among different behavioral spaces.
From the results, we have several other interesting observa-
tions: (1) LDA model performs poor in both datasets which
may indicate its performance is strongly sensitive to the data
quality. (2) CF-KDE and LDA model performs not well in
Yelp dataset comparing to Foursquare dataset, but the fused
model observes a surprising reversion. (3) The joint model
based on relative anomalous score Sr outperforms the model
based on logarithmic anomalous score Sl. (4) The joint model
(i.e., JOINT-SR, the joint model in the following sections all
refer to the joint model based on Sr) is indeed superior to the
fused model.
Response Latency Analysis. For each model, we also
evaluate the relationship between the efficacy and response
latency (i.e., a response latency k means that the identity theft
is detected based on k recent continuous behaviors). Figs. 12
and 13 demonstrate the AUC values and TPRs via different
response latency in each model on both datasets.
The experimental results indicate that our joint model CBM
is superior to all other methods. The AUC values of our joint
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Fig. 12: Identity theft detection efficacy via different response
latency (i.e., the number of behaviors in the test set we
cumulated).
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Fig. 13: The detection rates (TPR) via different response
latency with disturbance rate=0.01 (FPR=0.01).
model can reach 0.998 in both Foursquare and Yelp with 5
test behavioral records. The detection rates (TPR) of our joint
model can reach 93.8% in Foursquare and 97.0% in Yelp with
5 test behavioral records and disturbance rate (FPR) values
1.0%.
4.3.3 Robustness Analysis
Generally, there are two kinds of mutations in individual-level
(IL) suspicious behavioral patterns:
Completely Behavioral Mutation. Some thieves tore off
their masks once intruding into victim’s account. They usually
perform totally different interest in venues and topics.
Partially Behavioral Mutation. Some extremely cunning
thieves maintain part of victim’s behavioral pattern to get
further benefits from the victim’s friends. They may show
partial behavior mutation which makes it harder to detect these
anomalous behaviors.
In the previous experiments, we evaluate the performance
of our model in a scenario where thieves act like normal users
by exchanging normal user’s behavioral records (exchanging
both venue and UGC). Furthermore, we consider the harder
scenarios where thieves know part of victim’s habits and
accordingly imitate victims. We apply our model to these
scenarios, and demonstrate experimental results in Fig. 14.
The results validate that our method is robust for coping with
various suspicious behaviors.
4.4 Explanations on Advantages of Joint Model
4.4.1 Intuitive Explanations
Generally, there are two paradigms to integrate behavioral
data: the fused and joint manners [8] . Fused models [8]
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Fig. 14: The efficacy (AUC) and detection rate (TPR) of
identity theft detection via the joint model CBM in different
scenarios with disturbance rate=0.01 (FPR=0.01). Painted ones
denote AUC and shaded ones denote TPR.
are a relatively simple and straightforward kind of com-
posite behavior models. They first capture features in each
behavior space respectively, and then make a comprehensive
metric based on these features in different dimensions. With
the possible complementary effect among different behavior
spaces, they can act as a feasible solution for integration.
However, the identification efficacy can be further improved,
since fused models neglect potential links among different
spaces of behaviors. We take an example where a person
posted a picture in an OSN when he/she visited a park. If this
composite behavior is simply separated into two independent
parts: he/she once posted a picture and he/she once visited a
park, the difficulty in relocating him/her from a group of users
is possibly increased, since there are more users satisfy these
two simple conditions comparing to the original condition.
On the contrast, our joint model CBM sufficiently exploits
the correlations between behaviors in different dimensions,
then increases the certainty of users’ behavior patterns, which
contributes to a better identification efficacy.
4.4.2 Theoretical Explanation
We provide an underlying information theoretical explanation
for the gain of joint models. The well-known Chain Rule for
Entropy [50],
H(X1, X2, ..., XN ) ≤
∑N
i=1
H(Xi),
indicates that the entropy of N simultaneous events, denoted
by Xi, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , is no more than the sum of the
entropies of each individual event, and are equal if the events
are independent.
The chain rule for entropy shows that the joint behavior
has lower uncertainty comparing to the sum of the uncertainty
in each component [51]. This can serve as a theoretical
explanation of the advantages of our joint model.
5 LITERATURE REVIEW
Recently, researchers found that users’ behavior can identify
their identities [3], [28], [52]. Typically, behavior-based user
identification include two phases: user profiling and user
identifying:
User profiling is a process to characterize a user with
his/her history behavioral data. Some works focus on statistical
characteristics to establish the user profile. Naini et al. [53]
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studied the task of identifying the users by matching the
histograms of their data in the anonymous dataset with the
histograms from the original dataset. Egele et al. [8] proposed
a behavior-based method to identify compromises of high-
profile accounts. Ruan et al. [30] conducted a study on online
user behavior by collecting and analyzing user clickstreams
of a well known OSN. Lesaege et al. [29] developed a topic
model extending the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to
identify the active users. Viswanath et al. [44] presented
a technique based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
that accurately modeled the “like” behavior of normal users
in Facebook and identified significant deviations from it as
anomalous behaviors. Tsikerdekis and Zeadally [54] presented
a detection method based on nonverbal behavior for identity
deception, which can be applied to many types of social
media. These methods above mainly concentrated on a specific
dimension of the composite behavior without utilizing the
correlations among multi-dimensional behavior data.
Vedran et al. [55] explored the complex interaction between
social and geospatial behavior and demonstrated that social
behavior can be predicted with high precision. Yin et al.
[36] proposed a probabilistic generative model combining
use spatiotemporal data and semantic information to predict
user’s behavior. These studies implied that composite behavior
features are possibly helpful for user identification.
User identifying is a process to match the same user in
two datasets or distinguish anomalous users/behaviors. User
identifying can be applied to a variety of tasks, such as
detecting anomalous users or match users across different data
sources. Mazzawi et al. [56] presented a novel approach for
detecting malicious user activity in databases by checking
user’s self-consistency and global-consistency. Lee and Kim
[32] proposed a suspicious URL detection system for Twitter
to detect users’ anomalous behaviors. Cao et al. [22] designed
and implemented a malicious account detection system for
detecting both fake and compromised real user accounts. Zhou
et al. [57] proposed an FRUI algorithm to match users among
multiple OSNs. These works mainly detected the population-
level anomalous behaviors which indicated strongly difference
from other behaviors. While, they did not consider that the
individual-level coherence of users’ behavioral patterns can
be utilized to detect online identity thieves.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We investigate the feasibility in building a ladder from low-
quality behavioral data to a high-quality behavioral model
for user identification in online social networks (OSNs).
By exploiting the complementary effect among OSN users’
multi-dimensional behaviors, we propose a joint probabilistic
generative model by integrating online and offline behaviors.
When the designed model is applied into identity theft de-
tection in OSNs, its comprehensive performance, in terms
of the detection efficacy, response latency and robustness, is
validated by extensive evaluations implemented on real-life
OSN datasets. This study gives new insights into whether
and how modeling users’ composite behavioral patterns can
improve online identity authentication.
Our behavior-based module mainly aims at detecting iden-
tity thieves after the the access control of account is broken.
It is not exclusive to the traditional methods for preventing
identity theft. On the contrary, it is easy to incorporate our
module into traditional methods to solve identity theft problem
better, since our method is non-intrusive and continuous. We
would like to leave the study on the combinations of prevent-
ing and detecting methods from a systematic perspective as
future work.
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